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1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, climate change (and particularly the risk of abrupt, 
catastrophic changes), has been increasingly framed not simply as an 
environmental or social problem, but as a security threat (UN 2007; UN 
2011; German Advisory Council on Global Change 2007; Steinbruner et 
al. 2013; United States Department of Defense 2014), in an on-going 
process that has been referred to as the ‘securitization of climate change’ 
(Brauch & Scheffran 2012, p.7).  Amelioration of this threat has been 
cited as an important rationale for research into climate geoengineering 
(Schwartz & Randall 2003), in particular forms of solar radiation 
management (SRM) such as stratospheric aerosol injection, which have in 
recent years received increasing attention as potential policy options 
alongside climate mitigation and adaptation (IPCC 2013).  In one (albeit 
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atypically unrestrained) case, deterministic claims about the link between 
climate change and security have been used to call for immediate 
deployment of forms of solar geoengineering:  
‘[T]here now exists an extremely high international security risk of 
acute climate disruption followed potentially by runaway global 
warming … Rapid warming of the Arctic has already led to a 
disruption in the normal weather of the Northern Hemisphere, 
leading to widespread crop failures and societal disruptions which 
now threaten the existence of our civilization…  There is now only 
one course of action that will begin to have a sufficient impact in the 
available time … we must intervene rapidly. We must geoengineer 
with great urgency’ (AMEG 2013). 
Others have framed geoengineering in terms of humanitarian 
intervention, suggesting that the normative framework of ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’ (that emerged in the context of UN Security deliberations 
around international responses to genocide) might be interpreted as 
providing a normative basis for geoengineering: 
‘if geoengineering techniques might provide a means for avoiding 
some of the worst climate induced suffering of these populations — 
which would otherwise have no protection — does the international 
community have a ‘responsibility’ to explore and develop them?’ 
(Suarez et al. 2010) 
However, framing SRM as a response to the purported security threats – 
or humanitarian disasters -  posed by climate change, downplays the 
complexities of the relationships between environmental change such as 
climate change, and forms of insecurity and violence, as well as 
overlooking the massive physical and social uncertainties surrounding the 
impacts of SRM at regional and local scales, and the multiple ways in 
which these forms of geoengineering might themselves constitute novel 
threats to human security. This discussion paper will examine the inter-
linkages between climate change, solar radiation management and 
notions of security, proceeding in three stages.  Firstly the contested 
relationship between climate change and (in)security will be explored, and 
situated in the context of longstanding debates around environmental 
scarcity and conflict.  Secondly the emergence of ideas around climate 
engineering in general, and SRM in particular, will examined, and the 
historical and contemporary relationship of these ideas to military interest 
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in environmental manipulation and weather warfare will be explored.  
Thirdly the potential security implications of SRM will be examined. Claims 
that that these technologies might themselves constitute security threats 
(for example through potential for weaponisation/dual-use or through 
having regionally destabilising consequences) will be examined, and a 
number of scenarios featuring SRM will be reviewed.  Finally the content 
of a contemporary belief that SRM is being carried out in secret (the belief 
in so-called ‘chemtrails’) will be examined in order to explore the social 
dynamics – in particular issues of power and trust – that are already 
apparent in certain discourses around geoengineering. The paper 
concludes that solar geoengineering as a security motivated response to 
climate change is seriously flawed, and argues that rather than improving 
human security, the development and deployment of certain forms of 
solar geoengineering may have the opposite effect. 
2. Climate change and (in)security 
In order to assess claims that solar radiation management might be able 
to alleviate the purported security threats posed by climate change, it is 
necessary to ask what claims about climate change and security are being 
made, what the evidence for these claims is, and to understand how and 
why this framing of climate change has emerged.  Although consideration 
of the potential security implications of climate change stems back to at 
least the late 1980’s1, over the past decade there has been an increasing 
uptake of the idea of climate change as a security threat (Campbell et al. 
2007) by influential military think tanks (e.g. RUSI), national 
governments (German Advisory Council on Global Change 2007; Schwartz 
& Randall 2003; CNA 2007) and international institutions such as the UN 
(UN 2007; UN 2011), and even suggestions that wartime mobilisation 
might now be an appropriate model for rapid climate change mitigation 
(Delina & Diesendorf 2013). 
Clearly in some instances – such as the case of some Pacific Island States 
- the potential national security implications of climate change are very 
clear, with sea level rise threatening the very habitability of these places.  
As the President of the Federated States of Micronesia stated in 2001:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  for	  example	  the	  World	  Conference	  on	  the	  Changing	  Atmosphere	  –	  Implications	  for	  Global	  Security,	  held	  in	  Toronto	  in	  1988.	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‘Sea level rise, and other related consequences of climate change, 
are grave security threats to our very existence as homelands and 
nation states’ (Falcam 2001). 
Similarly, various authors have highlighted the national security 
implications and potential for ‘conflict over natural resources and sea 
lanes in Arctic regions that may become newly accessible as a result of 
the melting of sea ice’ (Steinbruner et al. 2013, p.31). In other cases the 
purported security threats associated with climate change are less direct, 
and include claims that climate change will lead to increased disruption 
and violent conflict globally as a result of struggles for increasingly scarce 
natural resources;  state failure; increased proliferation of diseases; and 
tensions related to large scale migrations. For example, the U.S. Centre 
for Naval Analyses produced a report in 2007 suggesting that ‘Climate 
change can act as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most 
volatile regions of the world’ and argued that this ‘presents significant 
national security challenges for the United States’ (CNA, 2007: 1) 
Tensions associated with large scale migrations were raised as a 
particular concern in a report prepared for the U.S. Pentagon in 2003, 
which warned that: 
‘climate change could become such a challenge that mass 
emigration results as the desperate peoples seek better lives in 
regions such as the United States’ (Schwartz & Randall 2003, p.5) 
Another report highlights the potential for climate change to destabilise 
‘weakened and failing governments’ fostering internal conflicts, extremism 
and ‘movement toward increased authoritarianism and radical ideologies’ 
(CNA 2007, p.6), and suggest that the U.S. ‘may be drawn more 
frequently into these situations’ (ibid p.6)(See also Ministry of Defence 
2010).  
Within current debates on climate change and security, the referent 
object – what exactly is to be secured, for whom, and how – varies. 
Although the nation state still dominates security discourse and policy 
(Barnett 2001, p.4), many observers have highlighted the inability of 
traditional national and international security approaches to deal with the 
threats posed by climate change.  As the report from the German 
Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) put it, climate change: 
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‘poses a challenge to international security, but classic, military-
based security policy will be unable to make any major 
contributions to resolving the impending climate crises’ (WBGU, 
2007, p.6). 
 
Similarly a CSIS report argues that: 
 
‘At a definitional level, a narrow interpretation of the term “national 
security” may be woefully inadequate to convey the ways in which 
state authorities might break down in a worst case climate change 
scenario’ (Campbell et al. 2007, p.9) 
 
The limitations of the national security framework for encompassing the 
range and nature of the threats posed by climate change has prompted 
some observers to argue that ‘[c]limate change is transforming the way 
we think about security’ (Parry 2007), and more expansive 
conceptualisations of climate change as a threat to human security 
(WBGU 2007) have thus come to the fore.  The term ‘human security’2 
shifts the referent object from the state world to ‘human beings, families 
and communities’ (Brauch & Scheffran 2012, p.3). Although sometimes 
critiqued for being overly vague and all-encompassing3, and suggestions 
that the concept itself has become a ‘new orthodoxy’(Christie 2010, 
p.170), the concept of human security has proven useful for thinking 
about the more complex destabilisation processes that may accompany 
climate change, and has been (according to proponents of the term) a 
necessary shift in terminology in response to the changing context of 
contemporary conflict and forms of insecurity.  As Renner explains: 
 ‘Traditionally [security] is seen as closely related to the threat or 
use of violence, and military means are regarded as central to the 
provision of security. This may once have made sense, when 
conflicts took place predominantly between different countries, 
when territorial control was a key objective, and when uniformed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  First	  outlined	  in	  detail	  in	  the	  UN	  Human	  Development	  Report	  (1994),	  human	  security	  is	  comprised	  of	  seven	  constituent	  parts:	  1)	  economic	  security	  (income)	  2)	  food	  security	  (physical	  and	  affordable	  access	  to	  food);	  3)	  health	  security;	  4)	  environmental	  security	  (access	  to	  safe	  water,	  clean	  air	  and	  non-­‐degraded	  land);	  5)	  personal	  security	  (	  freedom	  from	  physical	  violence);	  6)	  community	  security	  (freedom	  from	  ethnic	  violence);	  and	  7)	  political	  security	  (basic	  human	  rights	  and	  freedoms).	  3	  E.g.	  Paris	  compares	  the	  term	  to	  ‘sustainable	  development’,	  arguing	  that	  ‘everyone	  is	  for	  it,	  but	  few	  people	  have	  a	  clear	  idea	  of	  what	  it	  means’	  (Paris	  2001,	  p.88).	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soldiers were the combatants. But over the last several decades, 
this type of conflict has become more the exception than the norm’ 
(Renner 2006). 
The lens of human security has proven to be a useful framework for 
academic and policy analysis of the emerging threats posed by climate 
change (E.g. Brauch & Scheffran 2012), and the subject is currently being 
considered as part of the fifth assessment report of Working Group (WG) 
II of the IPCC, due for release in 2014. It has also been taken up by a 
range of other actors concerned about climate change  (including NGOs 
such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth).  One explanation for the 
ready uptake by a diverse range of actors of this framing of the problem, 
is that the concept of security conveys a particular urgency, capturing 
‘some of the more substantial political interest and superior financial 
resources associated with more traditional, military conceptions of 
security’ (Paris 2001, p.95).  This shift can also be understood as part of a 
broader trend since the end of the Cold War toward the consideration of 
environmental change in terms of security, which is, according to Barnett, 
‘as much a product of national security institutions seeking new raison 
d’etres as it is the dangers of environmental change’ (Barnett 2001, p.2).   
Although framing climate change in terms of security has been argued to 
be an effective way of bringing climate change into the realm of ‘high 
politics’ (Karafoulidis 2012, p.260), there are long-recognized risks to this 
process of ‘securitization’ including increasing the risk that this framing 
will be used to justify the implementation by states of exceptional 
measures, and the suspension of ‘normal’ political procedures and the 
rule of law (Waever 1989).  It has also been argued for instance that the 
framing of climate change as a security issue, 
‘risks making it a military rather than a foreign policy problem, and 
a sovereignty rather than a global commons problem. This may help 
justify further securing of the unsustainable livelihoods of the 
North …It may also lead to increased attention on securing territory 
against undesirable knock-on effects of climate impacts such as 
environmental refugees’ (Barnett 2001, p.11) 
Debates around the appropriateness or otherwise of framing climate 
change as a security issue can be traced back to earlier debates about the 
concept of ‘environmental security’ that emerged in the post-Cold War 
	   	  
	  
	  
	  
9	  
period.  Deudney famously argued for the need to challenge what he 
referred to as the ‘chronic militarisation of public discourse’ (p. 214), and 
made the case that: 
‘Environmental degradation is not a threat to national security.  
Rather environmentalism is a threat to the conceptual hegemony of 
state centred national security discourses and institutions.  For 
environmentalists to dress their programs in the blood-soaked 
garments of the war system betrays their core values and create 
confusion about the real tasks at hand.’ (Deudney 1999, p.214) 
Similar critiques have been elaborated in the Copenhagen School’s theory 
of ‘securitization’, which has drawn attention to powerful consequences of 
the speech act of denoting an issue as a security threat, and the tendency 
for this to bringing about a set of problematic practices including the 
expansion of state capabilities, the use of exceptional, illiberal and 
emergency measures and the suspension of normal rules of law and 
democracy.  The theory of ‘securitization’ describes this process as 
fundamentally negative in that it represents ‘a failure to deal with issues 
as normal politics […which should ideally] be able to unfold according to 
routine procedures without extraordinary elevation of specific threats to a 
pre-political immediacy’ (Buzan et al. 1998, p.29) 
Others have countered however, that climate change has the potential to 
transform the meanings of security (Parry 2007; Angela Oels 2012), and 
argued that there is little empirical evidence to suggest that 
‘securitization’ necessarily results in exceptional measures (Trombetta 
2012). For example, Trombetta argues that in fact there is  
‘little evidence that appeals to security, even those related to 
violent conflicts and the representation of climate change as a 
threat to global order, have brought about exceptional measures 
and ‘actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ 
(Trombetta 2012, p.159).   
Rather according to Trombetta, debates around environmental security 
has had a transformative effect on security practices.  She argues that 
the ‘logic of security and the practices associated with it are not fixed…but 
open to a process of transformation’ (p.161).  A similar point is made by 
Dalby who argues that: 
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‘Neither security nor environment can be taken for granted; one of 
the advantages of juxtaposing them is precisely that we are then 
forced to read each against the other and in the process challenge 
what is conventionally read into both of them’ (Dalby 2009, p.55). 
 
Climate change and human security 
Although the academic and policy debates on climate change and human 
security are relatively recent (Brauch & Scheffran 2012), debates around 
the purported linkages between environmental change, scarcity and forms 
of violence and insecurity stretch back at least as far as the 18th century 
ideas of Malthus (Malthus 1798).  Neo-Malthusian ideas suggesting a 
causal link between scarcity induced by environmental degradation and 
violent conflict/social breakdown re-emerged in the 1970’s debate around 
Limits to Growth,  and were further elaborated in the much-cited work of 
Homer-Dixon on ‘Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict’ 
(Homer-Dixon 1991), and apocalyptic articles such as Kaplan’s ‘The 
Coming Anarchy’ (Kaplan 1994), who argued that the environment 
needed to be understood as ‘the national-security issue of the early 
twenty-first century’. 
However, more than 20 years of empirical research now exists critiquing 
simple linear linkages between scarcity and violence/insecurity (Cole et al. 
1973; Eastin et al. 2011), and empirical evidence paints a much more 
complex picture.  For example, Barnett argues that while there may be 
some links between environment change and conflict, there is little 
evidence to suggest that environmental factors are the only (or even 
important) factors, and that: 
 ‘Other factors such as poverty and inequities between groups, the 
availability of weapons, ethnic tension, external indebtedness, 
institutional resilience, state legitimacy and its capacity and 
willingness to intervene, seem to matter as much if not more than 
environmental change per se’ (Barnett 2001, p.6) 
 
Dalby highlights that processes of globalization and the commodity chains 
that span the globe also problematize assumptions about local food 
shortages and abundance, which are ‘ increasingly a matter of trade as 
much as they are one of proximate ecologies’ (Dalby 2009, p.77). There 
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is also evidence that rather than resulting from scarcity, it is often the 
case that violent conflict results more in situations in which there are 
abundant natural resources coupled with high levels of inequality 
(particularly the case for example, in oil rich countries).   
With regard to climate change, echoes of earlier debates between more 
neo-Malthusian ideas and their critics, are apparent in current debates.  
Thus a number of deterministic arguments about the links between 
climate change and violent conflict and insecurity have been made by 
think-tanks, NGO’s (e.g. AMEG), popular science literature (Dyer 2010; 
Welzer 2012) and the global intelligence community. For example the 
2014 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community 
lists ‘extreme weather’ as one of the global threats, and argues that 
‘Extreme weather will increasingly disrupt food and energy markets, 
exacerbating state weakness, forcing human migrations, and 
triggering riots, civil disobedience, and vandalism. Criminal or 
terrorist elements can exploit these weaknesses to conduct illicit 
activity, recruit, and train’ (Clapper 2014, p.9). 
Despite this, there is also a growing body of research in this area (Jurgen 
Scheffran et al. 2012; Barnett & Adger 2007; Werrell & Femia 2013) that 
provides evidence that the purported linkages between climate change 
and (in)security and violent conflict are complex and convoluted, and that 
highlights the ‘difficulty of drawing precise causal arrows’ between climate 
change and particular instances of violence or insecurity (Werrell & Femia 
2013, p.2).   
Some work highlights the interplay between climatic factors and social, 
political and economic context.  For example a recent project on water 
conflict and climate change highlights the importance of context, pointing 
toward stronger links between political, economic and social factors and 
water-related conflict than between climate-related variables and water 
conflict.   Researchers observed that:  
‘climate and hydrological factors, socio-economic, institutional and 
political conditions are all important drivers of human (in)security, 
but their relative importance depends on the specific context in 
which they interact.  Adaptation plays a key role in determining 
whether climate change is likely to undermine human security’ 
(Kloos et al. 2013, p.7) 
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In some cases it has been argued that climate change is best understood 
as a ‘stressor’ that can ignite a volatile mix of underlying causes that 
erupt into revolution’ (Werrell & Femia 2013).  For example Sternberg 
draws out the linkages between climatic events in one region (China) and 
their global effects.  He examines the way in which a once-in-a-century 
winter drought in China reduced global wheat supply and contributed to 
global wheat shortages and skyrocketing bread prices in Egypt, the 
world’s largest wheat importer.  These ‘[hi]gher wheat prices affected the 
cost and availability of bread in Egypt, influenced citizen protests, and 
indirectly led to regime change in Egypt’ (Sternberg in (Werrell & Femia 
2013). 
Part of the difficulty of understanding the linkages between climate 
change and insecurity is a lack of empirical evidence.  For example 
Nordas and Gleditsch argue that ‘while the hard science in the climate 
change debate is backed up by peer reviewed studies, this is not the case 
for the literature relating climate change to conflict’ (Nordas & Gleditsch 
2007).  Others have suggested that the difficulty with attributing 
particular instances of violence, or particular security threats to climate 
change, is simply a reflection of the broader ‘longstanding difficulties in 
finding meaningful evidence of the determinants of violent conflict and 
war’ (Barnett 2001, p.5).   
Significantly for discussions around geoengineering, there is also a strand 
of work which highlights the way in which, rather than coming about as a 
direct result of scarcity due to environmental degradation, conflict may 
emerge due to changes in the political economy of energy resources as a 
result of efforts to mitigate climate change. For example Dalby highlights 
the ways in which mitigation practices associated with Carbon Markets, 
such as the purchasing by Northern Countries of large tracts of land in 
Southern countries in order to act as carbon sinks (e.g. REDD+ 
mechanisms), may disrupt local land uses, have an inflationary impact on 
land prices and availability, thereby contributing to rural instability and 
insecurity (Dalby 2013).  Similarly a recent NAS publication also touches 
upon the potential security risks associated with a range of policy 
responses to climate change, including geoengineering: 
[s]everal plausible security risk scenarios begin with policies to limit 
climate change. For example, the expanded use of nuclear power in 
some countries to replace fossil fuels could increase risks of nuclear 
proliferation. Some policies to increase biofuel production could 
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contribute to food price spikes and thus reduce effective food 
availability to low-income populations around the world. A single 
country’s decision to counter global warming by geoengineering, 
perhaps by fertilizing the ocean to grow photosynthetic organisms 
or by injecting sulfate particles into the stratosphere, could create 
conflict with other countries (Steinbruner et al. 2013, p.31). 
 
Scheffran et al. have pointed out that the addition of geoengineering 
measures for deliberate climate intervention would add ‘a new dimension 
of complexity’ into this already highly complex and uncertain picture 
(Jürgen Scheffran, Brzoska, Brauch, et al. 2012, p.810), and argue that 
this kind of extraordinary measure would be likely have negative 
outcomes: 
“If the debate on the securitization of climate change provokes 
military responses and other extraordinary measures, this could 
reinforce the likelihood of violent conflict.”(Jürgen Scheffran, 
Brzoska, Kominek, et al. 2012, p.870) 
The following section will trace the emergence of the idea of climate 
geoengineering within historical attempts at weather modification and 
environmental warfare before considering in more detail some of the 
possible security implications of future deployment of solar radiation 
management (SRM) as a response to climate change. 
3. Climate geoengineering, weather modification and 
‘weaponising nature’ 
Climate geoengineering4 has received an increasing amount of academic 
and policy interest in recent years (Belter & Seidel 2013), as a possible 
response to climate change.  Although the definition of geoengineering 
often includes reference to ameliorating the impacts of climate change 
(E.g. Shepherd et al. 2009), research into climate and weather 
modification has a long history, pre-dating concerns about climate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  term	  geoengineering	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  large	  scale	  technological	  attempts	  to	  manipulate	  the	  climate	  and	  climatic	  processes.	  	  Interventions	  that	  fall	  under	  the	  label	  of	  geoengineering	  are	  highly	  diverse	  (to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  umbrella	  term	  has	  been	  questioned	  (E.g.	  Buck	  2014),	  and	  some	  authors	  have	  called	  for	  its	  disaggregation	  (E.g.	  Heyward	  2013),	  but	  all	  share	  certain	  characteristics,	  namely:	  vast	  scales	  and	  massive	  infrastructure	  requirements,	  and	  significant	  but	  as	  yet	  poorly	  understood	  local	  and	  global	  impacts.	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change,  reflecting a variety of other interests, aims and concerns, from 
drought alleviation to hail and fog suppression, aircraft de-icing, to 
hurricane modification.  Historically, much of the research in this area was 
carried out by governments, conscious of the potential military relevance 
of such research.  As a 1996 report argues: 
‘the tremendous military capabilities that could result from this field 
are ignored at our own peril. From enhancing friendly operations or 
disrupting those of the enemy via small-scale tailoring of natural 
weather patterns to complete dominance of global communications and 
counter-space control, weather-modification offers the war fighter a 
wide-range of possible options to defeat or coerce an adversary’ 
(House et al. 1996, p.vi). 
The sometimes murky historical roots of contemporary ideas about 
climate geoengineering in historical efforts at weather modification for a 
variety of peaceful and offensive military purposes have been explored by 
a number of authors (Fleming 2006; Fleming 2010; Keith 2000; Hamblin 
2013; Harper 2008; Fleming 2013). For example, Fleming (2010) situates 
the current interest in geoengineering in the context of a long history of 
efforts to control weather and climate: from the pseudo-scientific 
practices of the ‘rain-makers’ of the 19th century, to the discovery of cloud 
seeding with silver iodide by Irving Langmuir in the 1940s, which 
spawned a number of military weather modification research projects as 
well as the beginnings of a commercial cloud seeding sector, and led 
eventually to the deployment of cloud seeding during the Vietnam War.  
Hamblin (2013) situates the military interest in and eventual offensive 
use of weather modification within the context of military planning for 
World War III during the Cold War, which saw massive efforts towards the 
‘weaponisation’ of nature more broadly, including research into: the 
development of biological and chemical weapons; the usage of nuclear 
weapons to create tsunamis or rising sea levels; the usage of pest species 
and ecological invasions as ‘crop warfare’; and weather modification.   
During the 1940s various attempts at local weather modification and 
larger scale modification of the climate were taking place on both sides of 
the Atlantic.  In the Soviet Union, Stalin announced his ‘Great Plan for the 
Transformation of Nature’ in 1948, which aimed (although ultimately 
failed) to create nearly six million hectares of new forest in the form of 
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windbreaks along the rivers of the Russian south and the perimeters of 
the collective farms. The plan was founded upon the premise that new 
forests would ‘halt desiccating Central Asian winds, cool and dampen the 
climate of southern Russia, and eliminate the periodic droughts that had 
afflicted the steppe for decades’ (Brain 2010, p.671). 
Meanwhile in the United States, one of the first weather modification 
research projects, known as Project Cirrus, was underway from 1947 – 
1952 (Havens 1952).  The project was carried out by a team from 
General Electric under government contract with the U.S. Army Signal 
Corps and the Office of Naval Research, and with the close cooperation of 
the U.S. Air Force, who provided airplanes and the associated personnel. 
Government involvement was felt to be necessary given potential national 
interest implications of weather modification, as well as the possibility of 
liability for damage from cloud- seeding experiments, or unanticipated 
side effects which was at the time felt to be a ‘very worrisome hazard in 
this new form of cloud experimentation’ (Havens 1952, p.13).  Project 
Cirrus involved numerous experimental cloud seeding flights, and the first 
(unsuccessful) attempt, in 1947 to modify a hurricane.  A quote by 
Langmuir in 1947 opining that the chances were ‘excellent that, with 
increased knowledge … we should be able to abolish the evil effects of 
these hurricanes' (Langmuir cited by Havens 1952 p. 64) was 
characteristic of the techno-optimism of the time.  However the project 
was largely unable to live up to the high expectations that accompanied 
it, and issues of definitive attribution plagued weather modification 
projects from the earliest days.  While the production of ice crystals and 
precipitation in the laboratory and under certain field conditions  was/is 
relatively uncontested, the precise nature of the impacts of any given 
seeding mission were harder to establish.  The write-up of Project Cirrus 
lists a number of ‘apparent limitations’ to the advancement of weather 
modification, largely ‘imposed by known physical laws’ (p. 76).  The most 
significant limiting factor was the presence of clouds of the requisite type 
and size:   
‘Certain clouds such as the fair-weather cumulus, have such a small 
volume and restricted area that, even though they are easily 
modified when super-cooled, their total liquid water content is 
inconsequential’ (p.77). 
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Despite these ‘apparent limitations’, military interest in weather 
modification continued.  According to Harper, military planners could not 
let go of ‘the tantalizing possibility of a non-polluting, untraceable, 
offensive and defense weapon’ (Harper 2008, p.20). From 1962 to 1983 
the U.S. Navy and the U.S. department of Commerce ran a collaborative 
project called Project Stormfury, during which various attempts to modify 
hurricanes using cloud seeding techniques were carried out.  However, as 
with Project Cirrus, the results remained inconclusive.5 
During the Vietnam War the U.S. Military operated a secret program of 
cloud seeding over North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia from 
1967 to 1972.  Codenamed Operation Popeye, the aim was to extend the 
Monsoon season and thus ‘muddy up’ the Ho Chi Minh trail that served as 
a conduit for Viet Cong supplies and personnel (Certini et al. 2013). The 
operation involved ‘over 2,600 cloud seeding sorties and expended 
47,000 silver iodide flares over a period of five years at an annual cost of 
approximately $3.6 million’ (Fleming 2006, p.13).   While some suggest 
that the project was a success in terms of extending the Monsoon season 
from 30 to 45 days (Certini et al. 2013, p.4) and making more difficult 
enemy movements, Fleming points out that no scientific data were 
collected to verify these claims, and cites sources involved at the time 
who claim that the cloud seeding produced ‘no appreciable increase’ in 
rain (Fleming 2010, p.181).  Despite the inconclusive nature of the 
project, the revelation in an article in the New York Times (Hersh 1972) 
that the U.S. had been cloud seeding as part of its operations in Vietnam 
was a catalyst for the eventual passing of the ENMOD treaty which came 
into force in 1978.  ENMOD prohibits state signatories from engaging in:  
‘military or any other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques having widespread, long lasting or severe effects as the 
means of destruction, damage or injury’ (Art I). 
The treaty has never been tested, partly because it seems that weather 
modification strategies never worked particularly well (Fleming 2013) and 
hence according to some, militaries lost interest (Ricke et al. 2008, p.12).  
Spending on weather modification research in the U.S. (which had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  example	  Willoughby	  et	  al.	  showed	  that	  ‘something	  very	  like	  the	  hypothesized	  Stormfury	  chain	  
of	  events	  happens	  in	  unmodified	  hurricanes’	  	  (Willoughby	  et	  al.	  1982,	  p.411).	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reached a high of $20 million in the late 1970’s) had dropped to just 
$500,000 by the early 2000’s (NRC 2003).  Then, in 2003 the U.S. 
National Research Council called for a coordinated program of research to 
reduce key uncertainties around weather modification (NRC 2003). 
Interest in hurricane modification which appeared to have waned, re-
emerged in 2008 when the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
convened a workshop on hurricane modification. The security-relevance of 
which was presented in the following terms: 
‘The potential loss of life, physical devastation, economic impact 
and loss of public confidence posed by a major hurricane could be 
as detrimental to the United States as any terrorist attack… 
[Sponsoring the workshop on Hurricane modification] is consistent 
with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 [and] the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) mission to respond to threats and 
hazards to the nation…’(US Department of Homeland Security 2008, 
p.3) 
Meanwhile the term ‘geoengineering’ had re-emerged onto the global 
research agenda following publication of the Nobel prize laureate Paul 
Crutzen’s 2006 article on Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (Crutzen 2006) 
which had appeared to break an unspoken ‘taboo’ among climate 
scientists on climate modification research.  There followed a flood of 
articles and an increase in funding for this work (Belter & Seidel 2013).   
Discussions of geoengineering are largely framed as a response to the 
failures of climate change mitigation efforts, and thus as being distinctive 
in aims and scale from earlier efforts at weather modification. However, 
despite efforts to draw a clear distinction between weather modification 
research and geoengineering research as operating a different temporal 
and spatial scales and thus being incomparable 6, it has been argued that 
the manipulation of weather and climate phenomena are in fact 
inextricably connected.  Indeed a number of prominent ‘geoengineering’ 
researchers7 were involved in the aforementioned DHS hurricane 
modification workshop indicating the cross-over of research interests and 
expertise.  Fleming makes the point that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  E.g.	  Bodansky	  refers	  to	  geoengineering	  as	  ‘Large	  scale,	  capable	  of	  affecting	  the	  global	  temperature,	  as	  compared	  to	  more	  limited	  local	  weather	  modification	  techniques	  such	  as	  cloud	  seeding’	  7	  Including	  prominent	  proponents	  of	  marine	  cloud	  brightening,	  John	  Latham	  and	  Stephen	  Salter.	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‘Any intervention in Earth’s radiation or heat budget (such as 
managing solar radiation) would affect the hydrological cycle and 
the general circulation… [T]he weather itself would be changed by 
such manipulation. Conversely, intervening in severe storms by 
changing their intensity or their tracks or modifying weather on a 
scale as large as a region, a continent, or an ocean basin would 
obviously affect cloudiness, temperature, and precipitation patterns, 
with major consequences for monsoonal flows and ultimately the 
general circulation. If repeated systematically, such interventions 
would influence the overall heat budget and the climate’ (Fleming 
2013, p.2). 
Solar radiation management 
Solar radiation management (SRM) is term that describes a sub-set of 
geoengineering proposals that attempt to offset the effects of increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the amount of solar radiation 
reaching the earth’s surface, and thus cool the planet8.  These techniques 
have sometimes been described (somewhat euphemistically) as ‘global 
sun block’ (Keith et al. 2010) or ‘sunshade’ technologies (Kosugi 2010). 
Due to its potential to reduce global temperatures rapidly, SRM has often 
been framed as a possible response to a current or future ‘climate 
emergency.’ Within this framing of geoengineering, the security risks 
posed by sudden catastrophic climate change are felt to justify either 
increasing research into (e.g. Schwartz and Randall 2003) or even 
immediate deployment of, solar geoengineering (AMEG 2013).  The so-
called ‘emergency framing’ has received widespread critique (Markusson 
et al. 2013; Sikka 2012; Nerlich & Jaspal 2012).  In common with critics 
of securitization more broadly, critics of the emergency justification for 
climate engineering argue that the invocation of an emergency is 
dangerous in that it can be used to justify exceptional measures and the 
suspension of normal democratic procedures.   
Proposed SRM techniques include inter alia Marine Cloud Brightening 
(Latham et al. 2012), the placing of mirrors or other reflective bodies in 
space (Angel 2006), and Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI) (Rasch et 
al. 2008; Crutzen 2006). The latter (SAI) is the technique frequently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Although	  the	  term	  is	  still	  widely	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  geoengineering,	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  ‘process	  of	  being	  abandoned’	  because	  there	  are	  ‘too	  many	  unknowns	  to	  really	  consider	  it	  a	  form	  of	  management’	  (Fleming	  2013,	  p.4).	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referred to as the ‘most promising’ of the solar radiation management 
geoengineering techniques (Volodin et al. 2011; Baum et al. 2013; 
Millard-ball 2012). SAI has been referred to as a ‘high leverage’ technique 
(Bodansky 2011, p.12), with the potential to reduce global mean 
temperature by a matter of degrees within months (Keith et al. 2010; 
Crutzen 2006). It has also been suggested to be relatively cheap (Boyd 
2008; Lane & Bickel 2013; Scott Barrett 2008), and hence within the 
reach of most countries – or even very wealthy individuals -  to carry out.  
However Pielke has pointed out that the uncertainties and ‘fundamental 
ignorance’ surrounding both the costs and benefits of SAI tend to make 
cost-benefit analyses of SAI less than meaningful (Pielke 2010, p.126).  
Others have pointed out that the phenomenon of ‘appraisal optimism’(cf. 
Flyvberg et al. 2003) is likely to be a factor in these estimates, and have 
highlighted the fact that the costs of a new technology frequently exceed 
estimates and expectations.  As MacKerron puts it, ‘[t]hese escalations 
have been frequent – virtually pervasive – where technologies are novel 
and/or the scale of activity has been large (‘megaprojects’) (MacKerron 
2014). Furthermore, MacKerron argues that economic analyses need to 
go beyond the simple calculation of costs, and to consider the economics 
of geoengineering, including a consideration of wider social costs and 
resource allocation issues. 
 
SAI is associated with a number of well-recognized, extremely serious 
problems.  One of the most serious of these is that although observations 
from analogous emissions of sulphate aerosols from large volcanic 
eruptions suggest that an SAI intervention would indeed act to reduce 
global mean temperature (Volodin et al. 2011), it would not perfectly 
offset global warming but would have a range of as yet poorly understood 
effects on regional climate and weather patterns (Angus J Ferraro et al. 
2014; Rasch et al. 2008; Trenberth & Dai 2007), including an impact on 
regional precipitation patterns (Hegerl & Solomon 2009; Angus J. Ferraro 
et al. 2014) and ozone depletion (Tilmes et al. 2008). Furthermore, it has 
been argued that the exact nature of these regional impacts could not be 
determined with any degree of accuracy before full scale implementation 
(Robock et al. 2010).    
SAI would not ameliorate ocean acidification associated with increasing 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Robock 2008), indeed, by providing 
what appears to be a quick fix to the climate change problem, it may in 
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fact weaken commitments to carbon emissions reductions and hence act 
to worsen these impacts (this is the basis of the so-called ‘moral hazard 
argument’ (Gardiner 2011)).  SAI is also associated with the need for 
forms of social and political commitment (forms of socio-technical ‘lock-in’ 
(Rayner et al. 2013; Cairns 2014) of a scope that are arguably 
unprecedented in human history: once embarked upon, a programme of 
SAI would need to be continuously carried out for hundreds of years in 
order to avoid the so-called ‘termination effect’ of rapid and dangerous 
heating of the planet (Jones et al. 2013).   It is this combination of traits 
that point to SAI having some of the most pressing security implications 
of the range of proposed geoengineering techniques. Some are novel 
(e.g. the implications of the ‘termination effect’ for which there is no 
comparable analogy) while others are what Dalby refers to as ‘very old 
security concerns related to the potentially dangerous decision by one 
power to act unilaterally in a way that other leaders may feel is a 
challenge either to their power in general or to their national interests 
directly’ (Dalby 2013, p.39). 
 
SRM: security dimensions 
There are a number of overlapping concerns around SRM, both from the 
point of view of human security and more traditional notions of national 
security: these include the possibility that some SRM technologies might 
have ‘dual-use’ (i.e. military as well as civilian uses); the possibility that 
SRM might be regionally destabilising; the vulnerability (of natural and 
social systems) associated with the so-called ‘termination effect’; and the 
security implications related to the exacerbation of (or the perception of 
exacerbation of) regional climate and weather damages (e.g. shifting 
monsoon patterns, drought in Africa Etc.) as a result of SRM deployment. 
 
Dual-use or weaponisation of SRM technologies 
Given the history of military interest in weather and climate modification, 
one concern about the  development of various geoengineering 
approaches (and SRM technologies in particular), is the so-called ‘dual-
use’ potential that these technologies might have (i.e. their potential for 
military as well as non-military applications) (House of Commons 2010).  
Hale makes the case that unlike other technologies that are understood to 
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have ‘dual uses’ such as nuclear power or genetic modification, ‘the 
traditional distinction between innocuous versus pernicious applications is 
considerably hazier for geoengineering technologies’ (Hale 2013, p.199).  
Others have gone further, highlighting the inherently ‘dual use’ nature of 
technologies or engineering practices more broadly, and critiquing the 
inclusion of climate change amelioration within the definition of 
geoengineering.  For example, Fleming argues that to ‘constrain the 
essence of something that does not exist by its stated purpose, 
techniques or goals is misleading at best’ (Fleming 2010).   
With regard to the potential for SRM to be ‘weaponised’, some observers 
have claimed that the ‘uncontrolled’ nature of SRM techniques makes 
them unattractive to military planners (Briggs 2013), and have suggested 
that this, coupled with their highly controversial and politically and legally 
sensitive nature, has meant that in the U.S. at least, ‘the U.S. 
Department of Defense has no interest in pursuing concrete actions in this 
field’ (Briggs 2013, p.1).  However, Schellnhuber has referred to SRM as 
exhibiting ‘MAD traits’ (Schellnhuber 2011), that is, traits for ‘mutual 
assured destruction’ similar to the characteristic of the nuclear arms race. 
Despite the lack of (available) evidence that the military is currently 
interested in the potential of SRM as a weapon, Olson points out that: 
 ‘if geoengineering research should lead to major advances in 
knowledge and techniques relevant for weather control, it is hard to 
imagine that knowledge not being put to use. In this respect, 
geoengineering is no different from other powerful technologies, from 
rocketry and atomic energy to computers and genetic engineering that 
have been put to military as well as peaceful uses’  (Olson 2011, p.16)  
It is also the case that, despite fears of a ‘rogue geoengineer’ or a 
‘greenfinger’ character (Bodansky 2013) acting unilaterally, it is more 
likely that any deployment of SRM ( particular SAI or space mirrors) 
would likely be carried out one (or more likely a coalition of) military 
bodies.  Indeed it is highly implausible, given the global security interest 
in ‘space superiority’ (Lord 2005) and the so-called ‘counterspace threat’ 
(Clapper 2014) amongst intelligence communities, that these technologies 
(in particular for example, space mirrors) would been seen as ‘neutral’ 
objects.  But rather would be incorporated into existing patterns of 
interests and military strategies.  As expanded in more detail elsewhere 
(Nightingale & Cairns 2014), it is more likely that the military, rather than 
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scientists, would undertake geoengineering, and that (SRM activity in 
particular) would be covered by Critical National Infrastructure policies, 
and as such would require a significant level of secondary security 
infrastructure. 
 
SRM and regional instability 
While the potential for ‘weaponisation’ of SRM technologies may be small, 
the destabilising potential of SRM techniques has been long recognised, 
as Schelling wrote in 1983:  
‘if the capacity to affect the radiative balance at non-prohibitive cost 
were acquired by several nations that disagreed about the optimum 
balance, that technology could be a source of conflict… The 
possibility of unilateral action, especially if it could be surreptitious 
and unverifiable, could cause trouble’ … ‘Weather and climate 
modification may be more a source of international tension than a 
relief’ (Schelling 1983, p.470).  
Although some observers have downplayed the risks of unilateralism as 
‘myths’ (Horton 2011), even David Keith – a leading proponent of 
research and possible eventual deployment of SRM -  has recognised the 
potential for SRM to have massively destabilising consequences (Keith 
2013). Ricke et al. (2013) argue that while it is unlikely that a single 
small actor could implement and sustain global-scale geoengineering 
without intervention from other world powers, a sufficiently powerful 
international coalition might be able to do so.  Indeed they illustrate that 
the regional differences in climate outcomes likely under different 
geoengineering scenarios would create incentives for any such coalition to 
be as small as possible, as it would be in coalition members’ interests to 
exclude non-members prefer levels of SRM other than those deemed to 
be optimal for the existing coalition’. 
One of the countries about which concerns over possible unilateral 
deployment of SRM have been raised is China (Victor 2011; Hamilton 
2013).  This is partly due to the country’s vulnerability to climate 
changes, the pressure facing the government to cut emission whilst 
maintaining economic growth, and in particular, its extensive existing 
programme of weather modification activities (Xueliang 2009).  However, 
various commentators have suggested that speculations about possible 
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Chinese rationales for geoengineering are not supported by solid evidence 
(Weili & Ying 2014) and highlighted that here are very few research 
articles on geoengineering-related topics in Chinese academia.  Similarly 
Edney and Symons (2013) surveyed Chinese public discourse, and 
examine the policy factors that will influence China’s position.  They argue 
that while Chinese climate scientists are ‘keenly aware of the potential 
benefits of geo-engineering as well as its risks’ there is no significant 
constituency promoting unilateral deployment of SRM.  Thus, they 
conclude that  
‘China will probably play a broadly cooperative role in negotiations 
toward a multilaterally governed geo-engineering programme but 
will seek to promote a distinctive developing world perspective that 
reflects concerns over sovereignty, Western imperialism and 
maintenance of a strict interpretation of the norm of common but 
differentiated responsibility’  (p. 1) 
Given the limitations to modelling and prediction of the future, one 
methodological approach to assessment of potential instability around 
SRM is scenario planning. Scenario planning emerged as a formal tool in 
military circles during the Cold War, and has become a widely used 
strategic tool in business, as well as becoming increasingly prevalent as a 
tool of environmental governance, particularly in the arena of climate 
change (Hulme & Dessai 2008). Scenarios are commonly understood as 
‘plausible, challenging and relevant stories about how the future might 
unfold’ (Raskin et al. 1995, p.36)9. The exploration of future scenarios 
featuring solar radiation management range from simple thought 
experiments described by individuals (Schellnhuber 2011; Bodansky 
2011) or multiple authors (Baum et al. 2013; Sweeney 2014), to 
structured exercises involving groups of ‘experts’ with multiple iterations 
and formal facilitation (Banerjee et al. 2013), or deliberative focus group 
discussions with ‘mini-publics’ (Macnaghten & Szerszynski 2013).   
Within the current range of scenarios featuring SRM one theme that 
emerges a number of times is that of conflict.  Schellnhuber for example, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  While	  some	  scenarios	  –	  such	  as	  those	  produced	  by	  the	  IPCC	  -­‐	  may	  have	  a	  significant	  quantitative	  dimension,	  applying	  particular	  consistent	  logics	  and	  assumptions	  to	  explore	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  given	  set	  of	  starting	  conditions	  and	  trends,	  others	  may	  be	  more	  qualitative,	  imaginative	  explorations	  of	  possible	  futures.	  	  Either	  way,	  scenarios	  are	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  predictive,	  but	  rather	  provide	  imaginative	  resources,	  possibly	  helpful	  in	  steering	  present-­‐day	  decision	  making.	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imagines a future pattern of SRM-related conflict and escalation of 
counter-warming strategies: 
‘Certain countries like Russia might actually welcome some warming 
of their territories. So would they shoot down, say, Indian or 
Chinese geoengineering missiles launched for stabilizing the Asian 
monsoon pattern or other tipping elements in the Earth system? 
One step further up the escalation ladder, the supposed 
beneficiaries of climate change might deliberately increase their 
greenhouse gas emissions for overcompensating SRM, and so on’ 
(Schellnhuber 2011, p.20278). 
Another scenario has explored the potential for SRM technologies to 
herald a future in which ‘countries, all following their own interests, 
[abandon] any pretence of returning the climate to how it was, and 
[start] to think about what kind of climate they would like to have..’ 
(Banerjee et al. 2013, p.13) In this future, increasing greenhouse gas 
levels combined with SRM have had a range of complex climate effects, 
requiring:  
‘a deeper and deeper commitment to more and more sophisticated 
global SRM technologies, along with a parallel array of regional to 
local weather modifications technologies to achieve ‘finer tuning’ of 
desired outcomes’ (Banerjee et al. 2013, p.13) 
In this imagined future, countries struggle repeatedly to find common 
purposes, but—much like the carbon mitigation negotiations of recent 
years —they eventually pull apart at the last minute. 
The ‘termination effect’ is the term used to describe the rapid warming 
that would accompany the cessation of a programme of SAI10, the 
potential implications of which have been explored in a scenario examined 
by Baum et al. The scenario (in this case a genuine ‘worst-case scenario’)  
examines the possibility of total societal collapse and potential human 
extinction resulting from a ‘double catastrophe’ involving the termination 
of a programme of SAI.  In this scenario, SAI is started, but halted due to 
a global catastrophe (e.g. nuclear war) resulting in global societal collapse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  There	  is	  agreement	  among	  climate	  models	  that	  ‘significant	  climate	  change	  would	  ensue	  rapidly	  upon	  the	  termination	  of	  geoengineering,	  with	  temperature,	  precipitation	  and	  sea-­‐ice	  cover	  very	  likely	  changing	  considerably	  faster	  than	  would	  be	  experienced	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  rising	  greenhouse	  gas	  concentrations	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  geoengineering’	  (Jones	  et	  al.	  2013).	  	  The	  rate	  of	  warming	  would	  depend	  on	  the	  length	  of	  time	  that	  SAI	  had	  been	  carried	  out,	  the	  rate	  of	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  during	  that	  period,	  and	  whether	  the	  programme	  of	  SAI	  was	  ceased	  immediately	  or	  phased	  out	  gradually.	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and the inability of the survivors to maintain the SAI.  The resulting rapid 
temperature increases puts additional stresses on the remaining 
population, potentially threatening their survival.  While the causes of the 
initial catastrophic collapse could be unrelated, Baum et al., (like 
Schellnhuber), do touch upon the possibility of the implementation of SAI 
itself being the cause of the initial conflict: 
‘Other states might object to SAI implementation—perhaps Russia 
would view warmer temperatures as beneficial for its agriculture, its 
Arctic shipping and oil drilling, and its overall quality of life. This 
dispute could increase geopolitical tensions and contribute to a 
major international conflict. A sufficiently severe conflict could 
induce a societal collapse and in turn an SAI double catastrophe’ 
(Baum et al. 2013, p.9).  
While some scenario planning exercises have as an explicit aim to better 
predict possible issues that might arise, and thus test ‘whether emerging 
governance proposals are able to effectively grapple with the array of 
issues manifest therein’ (Banerjee et al. 2013, p.6), in many cases (such 
as the ‘double catastrophe’ scenario), it is hard to imagine what kinds of 
governance structures would be able to deal with the kinds of 
vulnerabilities flagged up.  Indeed,  the issue of ‘audience’ has been 
raised as a general problem with scenarios such as those of the IPCC 
which appear to have little impact in terms of policy, but are widely used 
in a range of different contexts, understandable as ‘boundary objects’ 
(Pulver & Vandeveer 2009).)  The imaginative process of exploring 
possible futures has led some to claim for example that this technology is 
at odds with any kind of democratic governance (Macnaghten & 
Szerszynski 2013) or ‘simply ungovernable’ in any kind of desirable sense 
(Hulme debate).  For example, these authors argue that the ‘social 
constitution’ of solar radiation management is inimical to democracy: 
‘While plausibly able to accommodate diverse views into the 
formulation of its use, once deployed, there remains little 
opportunity for opt-out or for the accommodation of diverse 
perspectives. By its social constitution it appears inimical to the 
accommodation of difference. Following deployment it could only be 
controlled centrally and on a planetary scale’ (Macnaghten & 
Szerszynski 2013, p.8). 
Their analysis of public discourse around SRM lead them to the conclusion 
that SRM is likely to create: 
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‘a particular kind of world, one with an increased probability of 
geopolitical conflict, a new condition of global experimentality, and 
major threats to democratic governance’. 
Hence the purpose of exploring scenarios in this case is not to plan 
governance structures, but to argue that humanity should abandon SRM 
entirely.  
 
Regional and local impacts (real or perceived) 
Based on climate models and empirical observations following volcanic 
eruptions, it is widely acknowledged that the regional impacts of an SAI 
intervention are potentially severe (e.g. impacting on the Indian and 
African summer monsoons (Vaughan & Lenton 2011)). However, given 
the impossibility of determining regional impacts in the absence of full-
scale field trials, the impacts of an SRM intervention would remain 
uncertain until deployment (Robock et al. 2010).  As Szerszynski et al put 
it, ‘[d]eployment will thus always have the character of research’ 
(Szerszynski et al. 2013, p.2811). Indeed, even in the event of full 
deployment, (as is the case for attribution of particular events to 
anthropogenic climate change (c.f. Pielke Jr. 2010, chap.7)), natural 
climate variability would make any definitive attribution of cause and 
effect between a given SAI intervention and a particular regional or local 
impact extremely difficult if not impossible to ascertain.   
The impossibility of determining the regional impacts of SAI is for some, 
sufficient in itself to constitute a case against further research and 
development of SAI (Bunzl 2010), but others counter that scenarios of 
possible futures in a warmer world without SRM are equally risky and 
uncertain, and that therefore SRM might represent the ‘least bad’ option 
(Hunt in Specter 2012). However, Hulme (2014) makes the case, that in 
order to substitute one set of ‘global bads’ (i.e. the consequences of 
anthropogenic climate change) for another (i.e. the consequences of 
SRM) one has to be able to show that there is a net welfare benefit11.  
This is, arguably, impossible to do with SRM.  The problem is that while 
SRM might be effective at reducing global temperatures, these globally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  reduction	  of	  choice	  to	  two	  stark,	  generally	  unappealing	  options,	  has	  also	  been	  critiqued	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  tool:	  Sikka	  for	  example,	  points	  out	  that	  ‘setting	  up	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  exceptional	  scenario	  buttressed	  by	  panic-­‐ridden	  language	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  have	  a	  reasonable	  discussion	  about	  geoengineering’	  (Sikka	  2012,	  p.168).	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averaged quantities are not what cause climate loss and damage, rather it 
is the regional and local weather impacts that do this.  As examined at 
the outset, the linkages between climate change, regional and local 
weather changes and insecurity is a complex picture, with local impacts 
poorly correlated with increasing global temperatures.  Modelling by 
Ferraro et al. suggests that while SAI might be ‘broadly effective at 
counterbalancing regional changes in annual- mean surface temperature’, 
nearly half of the Earth’s surface would experience an increased risk of 
substantial precipitation change under an SAI geoengineered climate as 
compared to a climate change scenario of a quadrupling of carbon dioxide 
(Angus J. Ferraro et al. 2014). Hegerl and Solomon make a similar point 
that  
‘[c]limate change is about much more than temperature change, 
and using temperature alone as a proxy for its effects represents an 
inappropriate risk to the health of our society and to the planet’ 
(Hegerl & Solomon 2009, p.956). 
The potential for a global SRM programme to exacerbate or cause 
regional and local climatic disruptions also raises the possibility that there 
might be an increase in attempts at local weather modification such as 
cloud seeding in order to attempt to ‘balance out’ the effects of the SRM.  
The potential increase in local weather modification efforts as a result of 
climate change has been touched upon by Harper (Harper 2008, p.26), 
and emerged as a possibility in scenarios described by Banerjee et al. 
(2013). The ways in which these weather modification efforts might 
interact with any global geoengineering programme adds an additional 
element of uncertainty into the picture. 
In the same way that climate change is often referred to as a ‘threat 
multiplier’, so an SAI intervention might similarly be conceived.  However 
the crucial difference with SAI is that the problematic nature of attribution 
means that under an SAI-geoengineered climate, there would be a high 
potential for any local and regional climate damages to be attributed to 
the SAI intervention, with the accompanying possibility that these 
damages are interpreted as being the result of deliberate, aggressive 
acts.  The issues of perception, trust and power are crucial in 
understanding likely dynamics in this area. 
Attribution, perceptions, trust and power: ‘chemtrails’ 
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In a survey carried out in 2011, Mercer et al found that 2.6 % of a sample 
of 2893 people agreed entirely  that a secret program of SRM is currently 
taking place, while 14% of this sample believed this to be partly true 
(Mercer et al. 2011).  A Google search of the term ‘geoengineering’ 
reveals a large number of websites and organisations dedicated to 
exposing what is felt to be a ‘crime against nature’12.  For example, one 
site asks: 
‘Could there be a connection between the trails [left by 
aeroplanes] and our severe weather? While there are many 
agendas associated with these damaging programs, evidence is 
now abundant which proves that geoengineering can be used to 
control weather… While geoengineers maintain that their models 
are only for the mitigation of global warming, it is now clear that 
they can be used as a way to consolidate an enormous amount of 
both monetary and political power into the hands of a few by the 
leverage that weather control gives certain corporations over the 
Earth's natural systems. This of course, is being done at the 
expense of every living thing on the planet.’13 
The passionately held belief that an on-going programme of SAI 
geoengineering is causing widespread environmental damage and is 
responsible for millions of deaths has led to the expression of anger and 
violence towards those felt to be responsible.  Thus David Keith, Ken 
Caldeira and other proponents of research into SRM technologies have 
been subjected to harassment and even death threats (Keith 2013).  
Although these views may be scientifically unfounded, dismissing them 
out of hand is arguably to miss the insight that they reflect not so much a 
lack of science, but a lack of trust in scientists and a general scepticism 
towards powerful institutions (Cairns n.d.).  From the point of view of 
debates about climate change, SRM and security, the content of these 
claims is of interest in so far as it reveals the kinds of social dynamics 
that are already at play around these issues, and that are likely to 
become ever more significant in the future if research and activity in this 
area continues.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  E.g.	  http://www.geoengineeringwatch.org/	  ;	  http://www.globalskywatch.com/	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  http://www.chemtrailsprojectuk.com/	  	  13	  http://globalskywatch.com/featured/Why-­‐In-­‐The-­‐World-­‐Are-­‐They-­‐Spraying.html	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The possibility that SRM might be carried out ‘clandestinely’ (Banerjee et 
al. 2013, p.9) or ‘surreptitiously’ (Schelling 1983, p.470) has long been 
recognised, and this potential, coupled with the difficulty surrounding 
attribution of any given weather event to either climate change or SAI,  
has been highlighted as a potential source of conflict and insecurity.  
Given the historical association of weather modification and the military 
(as well as the wider history of the ‘weaponisation’ of nature (Hamblin)) 
the idea of an SRM conspiracy is perhaps not as far-fetched as some 
might imagine. For example, in 1962 at the height of the Cold War, just 
before the Cuban Missile Crisis, and at a time when Project Stormfury was 
underway, Hurricane Flora hit Cuba having made a ‘370 degree turn 
before lingering over Cuba for 4 days’ (Fleming p. 179).  The behaviour of 
the hurricane struck many as suspicious and prompted Fidel Castro to 
claim that the U.S. was waging strategic weather warfare on Cuba.  While 
no evidence ever emerged that Hurricane Flora had been manipulated in 
any way, the fact that it later came to light that just four years later in 
1966 the U.S. was indeed spending millions of dollars per year on cloud 
seeding operations over Vietnam as part of Operation Popeye during the 
Vietnam war, illustrates the difficulty in drawing a ‘bright line’ between 
real and imagined conspiracy (Dean 2000).   
While the belief in an ongoing ‘chemtrail conspiracy’ may currently be 
marginal, the kinds of fears that these beliefs articulate and the ways in 
which blame is attributed within them, arguably offer a window of insight 
into the likely sources of conflict and insecurity in an SRM geoengineered 
world. The recent attacks against polio vaccination workers in Pakistan as 
a result of a widespread belief that vaccination programmes in the 
country are part of a conspiracy to make male Muslim children sterile14, 
are a powerful illustration of the ways in which an apparently marginal 
idea can take root in a given context as a result of reflecting widely held 
worldviews and experiences (in this case anti-American sentiment and 
distrust of international institutions after years of conflict).  The ‘chemtrail 
conspiracy’ view arguably provides an indication of the shape of future 
conflicts and dynamics around SRM.  
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Conclusions: will SRM enhance global security?  
This discussion paper has explored the calls for more research into, and 
possible deployment of, solar radiation management as a response to the 
purported global security threats posed by climate change, situating these 
calls within longstanding (controversial) debates about the linkages 
between environmental change and forms of insecurity and violence, and 
a critique of what has been referred to as the ‘securitization of climate 
change’.  The discussion problematized claims of simple causal linkages 
between climate change and insecurity, highlighting the lack of empirical 
evidence of these links.  Where evidence exists, it suggests that political, 
economic and social factors are more likely determinants of conflict and 
insecurity than climate-related variables.  Furthermore there is some 
evidence, relevant to debates around geoengineering, that conflict may 
emerge as a result of efforts to mitigate climate change (e.g. REDD+).    
Current ideas about climate engineering were then situated in the 
historical context of efforts at weather modification for a variety of 
peaceful and military ends, before the possible security implications of an 
SRM intervention were examined.   
Although increased research into solar radiation management might 
reduce to some degree some of the uncertainties around physical impacts 
of an intervention, or the feasibility of possible delivery methods, research 
cannot predict or reduce uncertainties about possible social and political 
impacts of such an intervention.  These would remain unknown – as 
would the full extent of global physical effects of SRM – until deployment.  
However, knowledge of contemporary geopolitical realities from a range 
of social and political sciences or as explored through scenario exercises, 
suggests that the risks of negative security impacts of an SRM 
intervention would be high, and that the consequences would be severe.  
For example: the difficulties associated with attribution of negative 
regional or local climatic impacts to a given SRM intervention suggest 
potential for conflict and regional instability as a result of real or 
perceived negative impacts of SRM.  A window into the social dynamics 
that are likely to accompany further research and development of SRM 
can be gained by analysis of the contemporary belief in ‘chemtrails’, 
which highlights the crucial role that trust and power are likely to play in 
how these technologies and their (real or attributed) impacts are 
perceived.  Furthermore, the vulnerability of natural and social systems 
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that would accompany an SRM intervention due to the prospect of the so-
called termination effect mean that these technologies would likely be 
accompanied by high levels of military attention and would require high 
levels of secondary security infrastructure.  Taken together, the serious 
global security implications of SRM arguably constitute a persuasive case 
against any further development in this area, and neither the 
enhancement of national security, nor the protection of human security 
more broadly framed, would appear to provide a sound justification for 
increased research into, or deployment of a programme of solar radiation 
management. 
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